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Summary
Suppose that individual payoffs depend on the network connecting them. Consider the
following simultaneous move game of network formation: players announce
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consent. We provide necessary and sufficient conditions on the network link marginal
payoffs such that the set of pairwise stable, pairwise-Nash and proper equilibrium
networks coincide, where pairwise stable networks are robust to one-link deviations,
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When individual payo⁄s depend on an underlying network of bilateral links, self-interested players
may want to manipulate the network structure at their advantage. A model of network formation
needs to specify how players set up links with each other, together with a network equilibrium
concept compatible with this process. In recent years, di⁄erent network formation procedures and
network stability concepts have been proposed. This paper aims at wedging a bridge between the
di⁄erent stability notions proposed. We relate pairwise-stability, a prominent network equilibrium
concept due to Jackson and Wolinsky (1996), to proper equilibrium, a non-cooperative re￿nement
due to Myerson (1978).
Pairwise-stability is a network equilibrium concept that dispenses from any procedure of network
formation. By de￿nition, pairwise stable networks are robust to one-link deviations. Such one-link
deviations are either promoted by single players in isolation (in the case of link-cutting), or at the
coordinated initiative of pairs of players (in the case of link-creation). Pairwise-stability is a weak
equilibrium notion, often interpreted as a necessary condition for network stability,1 introduced
initially to document the inherent tension between stability and e¢ ciency in a network context.
Pairwise-stability is also extensively used for positive purposes due to its computational (relative)
simplicity, and to its ability to generate sharp predictions in many contexts.2
Myerson (1991) proposes a simultaneous move game of network formation, where players an-
nounce non-cooperatively the links they wish to form and the network that forms results from the
collection of these announcements. This game is simple and intuitive. When networks are directed
and links need not be reciprocated, standard Nash equilibrium analysis is informative about the
geometry of endogenous network architectures.3 Instead, when networks are undirected and link
creation requires the mutual consent of the two involved parties, a coordination problem arises.
The game displays a multiplicity of Nash equilibria.4 This coordination problem results from the
multidimensionality of the strategy spaces and the requirement of mutual consent. It is thus a
feature of the network formation process itself. Allowing for bilateral moves solves the coordina-
tion problem satisfactorily, as no mutually bene￿cial link is now left aside. We call pairwise-Nash
networks the Nash equilibrium outcomes that ful￿ll this added (coalitional-move) requirement.5
Our ￿rst result shows that pairwise-stability and pairwise-Nash equilibrium are two sides of the
same token when joint-links marginal returns and single-link marginal returns to currently existing
links are of the same sign, whenever the sum of the latter is non-negative. We call this condition
1Most likely, any equilibrium notion should, at least, check for one-link deviations.
2See Jackson (2003) for an exhaustive and recent survey on these issues.
3Bala and Goyal (2000) o⁄ers an analysis of Nash directed networks.
4For instance, the empty network is always a Nash equilibrium outcome (when nobody announces any link).
5The set of pairwise-Nash networks is thus at the intersection of the set of Nash equilibrium outcomes and the set
of pairwise stable networks. See Goyal and Joshi (2002), Bloch and Jackson (2004) and Calv￿-Armengol (2004) for
de￿nitions and applications of this equilibrium notion.
2￿￿convexity. Under this condition, robustness to unilateral or to multilateral link severance are
equivalent. Many existing models in the literature ful￿ll this condition, including the connections
model, the co-author model, models of information transmission on the network and oligopoly
markets, among others.
Pairwise-Nash equilibrium, though, su⁄ers from a serious conceptual drawback. Although in-
tended to be a non-cooperative equilibrium notion, bilateral and coordinated players moves are
explicitly allowed (as part of the equilibration process). Note that the process through which pairs
of players might coordinate on their strategies￿announcements is left unspeci￿ed. To avoid such ad
hoc coalitional moves, we focus on proper equilibrium, a Nash re￿nement due to Myerson (1978).
In a proper equilibrium, players best respond to perturbations of their opponents￿strategies, where
perturbations are ordered so that more costly mistakes are made with less probability.6
We provide necessary and su¢ cient conditions on marginal payo⁄s such that pairwise-Nash
equilibria and proper equilibria coincide. This condition is twofold. First, network payo⁄s must be
link-responsive, that is, the returns to any link are never zero. This is a mild requirement: net-
work payo⁄s with exogenous parameters are (often) generically link-responsive. Second, joint-links
marginal returns and single-link marginal returns to currently existing links are of the same sign
whenever the sum of the latter is non-positive, and whenever not only players use their discretion
to cut existing links, but also to create new ones. We call this condition ￿￿strong concavity. More
precisely, ￿￿strong concavity need only hold for those links not in the network and for which the
involved parties have con￿ icting interests in their creation (that is, one player would gain whereas
the other would loose). This condition thus trivially holds in networks where absent links are not
formed because neither player consents in its creation.
More precisely, link-responsiveness is enough to guarantee that any proper equilibrium network
in pure strategies is also a pairwise-Nash equilibrium. Reciprocally, assuming that payo⁄s are link-
responsive, all pairwise-Nash networks can be supported by proper equilibrium strategies if and
only if ￿￿strong concavity holds on the set of missing links that generate con￿ icting interests. The
proof for the second inclusion is constructive, and is sketched below.
Consider some pairwise-Nash network and an equilibrium strategy that supports it. In this
network, some links may not be formed by lack of mutual consent, even though it may be of the
interest of one of the two parties to create them. Now, modify the equilibrium strategy so that, the
interested parties systematically announce such (extra) links. Note that, at equilibrium, any such
players taken in isolation are in fact indi⁄erent between announcing and not announcing any of these
links (which are not formed anyway). Yet, the network equilibrium strategy at hand may exploit the
network payo⁄ externalities in some intricate way that does require some of these announcements
not to be e⁄ective (in the equilibrium strategy that supports it). The condition for ￿￿strong
6Ordered mistakes di⁄er by, at least, one order of magnitude. This hierarchy of mistakes distinguishes properness
from trembling-hand perfection.
3concavity is equivalent to stating that the strategy where all these extra announcements are made
yields the same equilibrium network. This condition is met for a variety of models, including the
connections model and information transmission. In particular, this shows that ￿￿concavity and
￿￿strong concavity are perfectly compatible with one another.
With this new equilibrium pure strategy pro￿le, we construct a completely mixed strategy
pro￿le by allowing players to make mistakes on link announcements. When mistakes vanish, the
mixed pro￿le converges to the equilibrium one. Mistakes are chosen so that links absent from
the network for which neither of the two parties agree on their creation are announced with a
(tremble) probability one order of magnitude higher than any other tremble. We show that this
mixed strategy pro￿le induces a quasi-perfect equilibrium in any extensive form equivalent7 of the
simultaneous move game of link formation. We then rely on an extensive form characterization of
properness by Van Damme (1984) and Mailath, Samuelson and Swinkels (1997) to establish the
relationship between proper and pairwise-Nash equilibrium. Incidentally, our analysis also sheds
light on the extensive form approach to network formation (and corresponding extensive form
equilibrium re￿nements), pioneered by Aumann and Myerson (1988).
Section 2 describes networks, payo⁄s and de￿nes ￿￿convexity and ￿￿strong concavity. Section
3 introduces network formation games and stability concepts. Section 4 contains the main results
and some examples. The proofs of the main results are gathered in Section 5.
2 Network payo⁄s
Networks N = f1;:::;ng is a set of players.
Players on N are connected by a network g, a collection of direct links. Let ij 2 g be a direct
link between players i and j in g . We focus on undirected networks, where ij 2 g is equivalent to
ji 2 g.
Let gN denotes the complete network where each player i 2 N is directly linked to any other
player j 2 Nnfig. Then, G =
￿
g ￿ gN￿
is the set of undirected networks on N.
Let g 2 G and ij 2 g a link. For all ij = 2 g, g + ij is the network obtained by adding the new
link ij to g. Similarly, for all ij 2 g, g ￿ ij is the network obtained by eliminating the current link
ij from g.
Network payo⁄s A network payo⁄ function is a mapping u : G ! RN that assigns to each
network g a payo⁄ ui(g) for each player i 2 N. Some examples are provided below.
Link marginal payo⁄s Let g 2 G. For all player i 2 N and link ij 2 g, we denote by:
mijui(g) = ui(g) ￿ ui(g ￿ ij)
7Both with complete and incomplete information.
4the marginal payo⁄ accruing to i from the link ij in the network g. Given a collection of current
links ij1;:::;ij‘ 2 g of player i in g, the marginal joint value of these links accruing to i in g is:
mij1;:::;ij‘ui(g) = ui(g) ￿ ui(g ￿ ij1 ￿ ::: ￿ ij‘):
Consider now some new direct link ij = 2 g of player i, absent from g. Then, mijui(g + ij) is the
marginal payo⁄ accruing to i from the new link ij added to g, and the joint marginal value of a
collection of new links ij1;:::;ij‘ = 2 g is mij1;:::;ij‘ui(g + ij1 + ::: + ij‘).
￿￿convexity and ￿￿strong concavity in new links The following de￿nitions documents
two possible features displayed by link marginal payo⁄s.
Let u be a network payo⁄ function, A ￿ G and ￿ ￿ 0.






u is ￿￿convex on A if and only if ui is ￿￿convex on A for each i 2 N:
The condition for ￿￿convexity states that the joint marginal value of a group of links already
in the network is higher than the sum of the marginal values of each single link, scaled by ￿. The
case ￿ = 1 corresponds to convexity. ￿￿convexity is a property that applies to marginal payo⁄
returns from existing links only.8
Let g 2 G. For all i 2 N, let gi = fij 2 gg be the set of direct links stemming from i in g, and
gi = fij = 2 gg the set of i￿ s missing direct links in g. Let ￿i ￿ gi be a subset of i￿ s missing links in
g, and ￿ > 0.
De￿nition 2 Let i 2 N. Then, ui is ￿￿strongly concave in own new links on ￿i if and only if,
for all ij‘+1;:::;ij‘+‘0 2 g and ij1;:::;ij‘ 2 ￿i, we have:
mij1;:::;ij‘ui(g + ij1 + ::: + ij‘ ￿ ij‘+1 ￿ ::: ￿ ij‘+‘0) ￿ ￿
‘ X
p=1
mijpui(g + ijp): (2)
Suppose ￿rst that ￿i = ;. Then, ￿￿strong concavity states that the joint marginal value of a
group of links already in the network is higher than the sum of the marginal values of each single
link, scaled by ￿. The case ￿ = 1 corresponds to concavity. When ￿i = ;, ￿￿strong concavity is
simply the dual of ￿￿convexity.
Suppose now that ￿i 6= ;. Then, ￿￿strong concavity compares the joint-links marginal value
of current links to the sum of their single-link marginal values, both in the original network g and
8Given that marginal link values are only computed for links already in the network, a more precise (but intro-
verted) wording would be ￿￿convexity in own current links. We keep ￿￿convexity for short.
5in every supernetwork of g where subsets of links in ￿i are added. ￿￿strong concavity is thus
a stronger version of ￿￿concavity that allows for link addition for the comparison of marginal
payo⁄s.9
Note that ￿￿convexity on A implies ￿0￿convexity on A, for all ￿ > ￿0 ￿ 0, and similarly for
￿￿strong concavity, for all ￿0 > ￿ > 0. In fact, both conditions are equivalent to a sign preserving
condition for joint-link marginal payo⁄s versus the sum of single-link marginal payo⁄s. Formally,





+1, if x > 0
0, if x = 0
￿1, if x < 0
:
Proposition 1 Let A ￿ G, ￿ ￿ 0 and i 2 N. Then, ui is ￿￿convex on A if and only if, for all




mijpui(g)) ￿ 0 implies !(mij1;:::;ij‘ui(g)) ￿ 0:
Let ￿i ￿ gi and ￿ > 0. Then, ui is ￿￿strongly concave in own new links on ￿i if and only if,




mijpui(g + ijp)) ￿ 0 implies





In what follows, we ￿rst de￿ne pairwise-stability, due to Jackson and Wolinsky (1996), and often
interpreted as a necessary condition for network equilibrium.10
We then formulate a simultaneous move game of network formation due to Myerson (1991).
This game is simple and intuitive, but generally displays a multiplicity of Nash equilibria. To
accommodate this fact, we de￿ne pairwise-Nash equilibrium, a variation of Nash equilibrium where
players are allowed to deviate by pairs.11
Finally, we recall the de￿nition of proper equilibrium, a Nash equilibrium re￿nement for simul-
taneous move games introduced by Myerson (1978).
9Again, a more precise wording for this condition on marginal payo⁄s would be ￿￿strong concavity in own current
links and own new links in ￿i.
10See also Jackson and Watts (2002) for a dynamic foundation of pairwise-stability.
11See Bloch and Jackson (2004), Calv￿-Armengol (2004) and Goyal and Joshi (2002) for applications of this concept.
See also Dutta and Mutuswami (1997) and Jackson and van den Nouweland (2000) for alternatives to pairwise stability
and Nash equilibrium that allow for coalitional moves.
6Pairwise-stability Pairwise stable networks are robust to one-link deviations, where link
severance is unilateral, while link creation is bilateral and under mutual consent of the two involved
players.
De￿nition 3 A network g 2 G is pairwise stable with respect to the network payo⁄ function u if and
only if, for all ij 2 g, both mijui(g) ￿ 0 and mijuj(g) ￿ 0, while for all ij = 2 g, if mijui(g+ij) > 0,
then mijuj(g + ij) < 0, for all i 2 N.
We denote by PS(u) the set of pairwise stable networks with respect to u.
A simultaneous move game of network formation This game is due to Myerson (1991).12
The set of players is N. All players i 2 N simultaneously announce the direct links they wish to
form. Formally, Si = f0;1g
n￿1 is i￿ s set of pure strategies. Let si = (si1;:::si;i￿1;si;i+1;:::sin) 2
Si. Then, sij = 1 if and only if i wants to set up a direct link with j 6= i (and thus sij = 0,
otherwise). We assume that mutual consent is needed to create a direct link, that is, ij is created
if and only if sijsji = 1.
Let S = S1￿:::￿Sn. A pure strategy pro￿le s = (s1;:::;sn) 2 S induces an undirected network
g (s).
Let ￿i = ￿(f0;1g
n￿1) be i￿ s set of mixed strategies, where ￿(f0;1g
n￿1) denotes the set of
probability distributions over f0;1g
n￿1. A mixed strategy ￿i 2 ￿i is thus a joint (multivariate
Bernoulli) distribution that allows for rich correlation patterns in individual link announcements.
In particular, given a mixed strategy ￿i, i announces a link with j with marginal probability:13




Let ￿ = ￿1 ￿ ::: ￿ ￿n. A mixed strategy ￿ = (￿1;:::;￿n) 2 ￿ generates a probability distribution
over G, a random graph.14
Pairwise-Nash equilibrium A pure strategy pro￿le s￿ = (s￿
1;:::;s￿
n) is a Nash equilibrium







, for all si 2 Si and i 2 N.
Nash equilibrium, though, is too weak an equilibrium concept to single out equilibrium networks.
For instance, the empty network is always a Nash equilibrium.15 Building upon pairwise-stability,
12To quote Myerson: ￿Now consider a link-formation process in which each player independently writes down a
list of players with whom he wants to form a link (...) and the payo⁄ allocation is (...) for the graph that contains a
link for every pair of players who have named each other." (p. 448)
13Note that, for n ￿ 3, the collection of such marginal probabilities does not de￿ne univocally a mixed strategy.
FrØchet (1951) gives an early and thorough account of the relationship between joint distributions (here, mixed
strategies on the collection of all link announcements) and marginals (here, single link probabilities) when n = 3.
14See Jackson and Rogers (2004) for a relation between random graphs and individual incentives.
15When nobody announces any link.
7we further require that any mutually bene￿cial link be formed at equilibrium. Pairwise-Nash
equilibrium networks are robust to bilateral commonly agreed one-link creation, and to unilateral
multi-link severance.
De￿nition 4 A network g 2 G is a pairwise-Nash equilibrium network with respect to the network
payo⁄ function u if and only if there exists a Nash equilibrium strategy pro￿le s￿ that supports g,
that is, g = g(s￿), and, for all ij = 2 g, if mijui(g + ij) > 0, then mijuj(g + ij) < 0, for all i 2 N.
We denote by PNE(u) the set of pairwise-Nash equilibrium networks with respect to u.
Proper equilibrium
De￿nition 5 A strategy pro￿le ￿ 2 ￿ is proper if there exists a sequence of completely mixed
equilibrium strategy pro￿les f￿"tgt2N with limit ￿ such that, for all i 2 N, s0
i;s00






￿i) implies that ￿"t
i (s00
i ) ￿ "t ￿ ￿"t
i (s0
i):
This re￿nement is due to Myerson (1978). In a proper equilibrium, players best respond to
perturbations of their opponents￿strategies, where costly mistakes are made with less probabil-
ity. This hierarchy of mistakes di⁄erentiates properness from trembling-hand perfection. Myerson
(1978) showed that every game has a proper equilibrium. We denote by PRE(u) the set of proper
Nash equilibrium networks in pure strategies with respect to u.16
4 The results
We ￿rst provide necessary and su¢ cient conditions on the payo⁄ function u for the set of pair-
wise stable networks and the set of pairwise-Nash equilibrium networks to coincide. We latter
characterize the equivalence between pairwise-Nash equilibrium networks and proper equilibrium
networks.
Pairwise stable and pairwise-Nash equilibrium networks
Theorem 1 PS(u) = PNE(u) if and only if u is ￿￿convex on PS(u), for some ￿ ￿ 0.
16We want to establish necessary and su¢ cient conditions such that the set of pairwise stable, pairwise-Nash and
proper equilibrium networks coincide. Given that both pairwise-stability and pairwise-Nash networks are only de￿ned
for pure strategies (that is, deterministic networks), we restrict attention to proper equilibria in pure strategies.
Myerson (1978) shows that any ￿nite normal form game has a proper equilibria. Given our restricttion to pure
strategies, existence is not warranted here. See Jackson and Watts (2001) for a perspective on the existence of
pairwise stable networks.
8The proof derives from the simple observation that, when payo⁄s are ￿￿convex on PS(u) for
some ￿ ￿ 0, if a player does not bene￿t from severing any single link, then he does not gain from
cutting any group of links simultaneously. Robustness to unilateral or to multilateral link severance
are equivalent when marginal payo⁄s from existing links satisfy (1) on some particular set.
Pairwise-Nash and proper equilibrium networks We now de￿ne link-responsive network
payo⁄s functions.
De￿nition 6 The network payo⁄ function u is link-responsive if and only if mij1;:::;ij‘ui(g) 6= 0,
for all i 2 N, ij1;:::;ij‘ 2 g, and g 2 G.
Link-responsiveness states that no link removal or addition is innocuous for the players directly
involved. Network payo⁄ functions that depend on some exogenous set of parameters (e.g., a
constant marginal-link cost) are generically link-responsive..
For all g 2 G and u, let ￿i(g;u) = fij = 2 g : mijui(g + ij) ￿ 0g be the set of i￿ s direct links not
in g with non-positive marginal returns.
Theorem 2 Suppose that u is link-responsive. Then, PNE(u) = PRE(u) if and only if ui is
￿￿strongly concave in own new links on ￿i(g;u), for all i 2 N and g 2 PNE(u), for some ￿ > 0.
Link-responsiveness is enough for any proper equilibrium network to be pairwise-Nash, while
￿￿strong concavity on ￿i(g;u) is needed to sustain pairwise-Nash equilibria as proper. Consider
some pairwise-Nash equilibrium g, and s an equilibrium strategy pro￿le that supports it. Now,
modify the pro￿le s the following way. For each single link not in g, say ij = 2 g, if one of the two
parties involved agrees to create such a link, say i,17 then modify s by letting i announce this link,
that is, set sij = 1. The new strategy pro￿le obtained from this procedure is still an equilibrium
strategy that supports g if and only if the condition in Theorem 2 holds.
With this new equilibrium pure strategy pro￿le, we construct a completely mixed strategy
pro￿le by allowing players to make mistakes on link announcements. When mistakes vanish, the
mixed pro￿le converges to the equilibrium one. Mistakes are chosen so that links (not in g) for
which neither of the two parties agree on their creation are announced with a (tremble) probability
one order of magnitude higher than any other tremble probability on any other link announcement.
This mixed strategy pro￿le induces a quasi-perfect equilibrium in any extensive form equivalent of
the simultaneous move game of link formation.18 We ￿nally invoke a result by Mailath, Samuelson
and Swinkels (1997) who provide an extensive form characterization of properness by means of
quasi-perfect equilibrium strategies.
17That is, mijui(g + ij) > 0.
18Quasi-perfection, a notion due to van Damme (1984), requires that, with the limit strategy, players are best-
responding at all information sets to each element of the sequence of perturbed strategies. Quasi-perfection also
forces players to ignore their perturbations in their own strategies.
9When links absent from the network are such that no player consents in their creation, then
￿i(g;u) = ;, for all i 2 N, and any pairwise-Nash equilibrium outcome is proper. In particular,
when the complete network is a pairwise-Nash equilibrium outcome, it is also proper.
Corollary 1 Let g 2 PNE(u). Suppose that, for all ij = 2 g, we have mijui(g + ij) < 0 and
mijuj(g + ij) < 0. Then, g 2 PRE(u).
In what follows, we ￿rst show with an example that trembling-hand perfect equilibrium out-
comes need not be pairwise-Nash, even when the conditions in Theorem 2 hold. This justi￿es the
need to resort to proper equilibrium, a re￿nement that di⁄ers from trembling-hand by imposing a
hierarchy on trembles related to the relative cost values associated with these mistakes.
Example (trembling-hand networks need not be pairwise-Nash) Let N = f1;2;3g and con-

















































Denote by 1 the player at the top, and by 2 and 3 the players at the bottom, and let S1 =
f(s12;s13) 2 f0;1g2g; S2 = f(s21;s23) 2 f0;1g2g and S3 = f(s31;s32) 2 f0;1g2g. The only pairwise-
Nash equilibrium network is gIV. The network payo⁄ function u is link-responsive and satis￿es (2).
The empty network gI is a trembling-hand network for the pure strategy s￿ = ((1;1);(0;0);(0;0))
in which player 1 announces all the links, and players 2 and 3 do not announce any link. This















3((0;0)) = 1 ￿ 3"
Next, we apply our results to the connections model and the co-author model, both due to
Jackson and Wolinsky (1996), and to a model of information transmission due to Calv￿-Armengol
(2004).
10Example (connections model) This model is due to Jackson and Wolinsky (1996). Suppose





for some ￿ 2 (0;1), where ni(g) = #gi and dij(g) is the geodesic distance between i and j. As
marginal link costs are constant, we focus on link marginal gross returns. As an agent might be
connected indirectly to another agent through several paths, the number of indirect connections
lost under multiple link cutting would be greater than the sum of the losses over links, when each
is cut individually. Hence, as is shown in Lemma 2 in Section 5, the connections model is 1-convex
for all the networks. Next, note that u satis￿es (2) for the complete network and for stars on the
cost ranges where these are pairwise stable (resp. c < ￿ ￿ ￿2 and ￿ ￿ ￿2 < c < ￿).19 This is a
consequence of Corollary 1, as peripheral players in the star network get a negative return from
any direct link with one another. Note also that u is generically link-responsive. Therefore, stars
and the complete network are (generically) proper equilibria when c < ￿ ￿ ￿2 and ￿ ￿ ￿2 < c < ￿,
respectively.
Example (co-author model) This model is due to Jackson and Wolinsky (1996). Suppose
that network payo⁄s are given by:









if #gi ￿ 1, and ui(g) = 0, otherwise. Then, straight calculations show that u is 2=n3￿convex in
own current links on G. The set of pairwise stable and pairwise-Nash equilibrium networks thus
coincide. Pairwise stable networks consist on a sequence of fully connected networks such that, if
we order this sequence by components￿sizes, the square of the size of any component is smaller
than the next size in this sequence.20 It is plain that any player in a component gains by cutting
current links with its component mates and rewiring with players in components of smaller size.
Such links, though, are not formed because it is not in the interest of the latter (the players in the
components of smaller size) to consent to this rewiring process. In fact, (2) does not hold, and
pairwise stable networks are not proper (except for the complete network, which is pairwise stable,
pairwise-Nash and proper).
Example (information transmission) This model is due to Calv￿-Armengol (2004). Suppose
that network payo⁄s are given by:




19See Proposition 2 in Jackson and Wolinsky (1996).
20See Proposition 4 in Jackson and Wolinsky (1996).
11where pji(g) 2 (0;1), for all i;j 2 N. In this case, u is 1￿convex in own current links on G, and the
set of pairwise stable and pairwise-Nash equilibrium networks coincide.21 Note that u is generically



































When the pij￿ s take a particular expression,22 gI, gII and gIII are the only pairwise stable networks,
each for some cost range. Corollary 1 implies that only gI and gIII are (generically) proper on the
cost ranges where these are pairwise stable (and only there).
5 Main proofs
Proof of Proposition 1 Derives from the fact that G is a ￿nite set.
Proof of Theorem 1 First, it is clear that PNE(u) ￿ PS(u). Hence, if PS(u) = ;, the
result follows. Suppose now that PS(u) 6= ;, and let g￿ 2 PS(u). De￿ne:
￿(g￿;u) 2 minfmijui(g￿) : ij 2 g;i 2 Ng:
Pairwise-stability implies that ￿(g￿;u) ￿ 0. Suppose that u is ￿￿convex in own current links
on PS(u) for some ￿ ￿ 0. Then, (1) implies that mij1;:::;ij‘ui(g￿) ￿ ￿‘￿(g￿;u) ￿ 0, for all
ij1;￿￿￿ ;ij‘ 2 g￿ and i 2 N. Moreover, by de￿nition of pairwise-stability, if mijui(g￿+ij) > 0, then
mijuj(g￿ + ij) < 0, for all ij = 2 g￿ and i 2 N. Therefore, g￿ 2 PNE(u).
Now, suppose that there exists g￿ 2 PS(u) such that, for all ￿ ￿ 0, (1) does not hold for g￿.
Then, for some i 2 N, there exists ij1;￿￿￿ ;ij‘ 2 g￿ such that mij1;:::;ij‘ui(g￿) < 0, implying that
g￿ = 2 PNE(u).
21This results from Claim 2 in Calv￿-Armengol (2004).
22Let ui (g) = 1 ￿ b
Q
ij2g q (nj (g)) ￿ cni (g), where
q (nj (g)) =




This is i￿ s expected payo⁄ for a stochastic process of information transmission in the network. Then, gI, gII and gIII
are the unique pairwise-stable networks for some cost ranges (see Calv￿-Armengol 2004).
12Proof of Theorem 2 We decompose the proof in two parts. Proposition 2 establishes that
PRE(u) ￿ PNE(u) when u is link-responsive. Suppose that u is link-responsive. Proposition 3
then shows that PNE(u) ￿ PRE(u) if and only if u is ui is ￿￿strongly concave in own new links
on ￿i(g;u), for all i 2 N and g 2 PNE(u), for some ￿ > 0.
Proposition 2 If the network payo⁄ u is link-responsive, then PRE(u) ￿ PNE(u).
Proof. Let u be link-responsive. We show that g = 2 PNE(u) implies that g = 2 PRE(u).
Let g￿ be a Nash equilibrium outcome such that mijui(g￿ + ij) > 0 and mijuj(g￿ + ij) ￿ 0,
for some ij = 2 g￿. Then, g￿ = 2 PNE(u). Suppose that g￿ 2 PRE(u), and let s￿ be a pure strategy
proper equilibrium that supports it. Then, g￿ = g(s￿). Let f￿"tgt2N be a sequence of completely
mixed strategy pro￿les such that limt!+1 ￿"t(s￿) = 1, and ￿"t is an "t￿proper equilibrium of the
link formation game with network payo⁄s u, for all t 2 N.
Given that s￿ is also a Nash equilibrium strategy and that ij = 2 g￿, necessarily, s￿
ij = s￿
ji = 0:
For all j 6= i, de￿ne e(ij) = (0;:::;sij = 1;0;:::;0). In e(ij), player i only announces the link
with j. Let s0
i = s￿
i _ e(ij). In s0
i, player i announces exactly the same links than in s￿
i plus an
extra link with player j. This extra link is not reciprocated by player j in s￿.

















i;e s￿i) = ui(g(s0
i;e s￿i)) ￿ ui(g(s￿
i;e s￿i)). For all e s￿i such that e sji = 0, we have
g(s0
i;e s￿i) = g(s￿
i;e s￿i), and ￿i(s0
i;s￿











Let e s￿i 2 S￿i such that e sji = 1. Let e g = g(s￿
i;e s￿i). Note that e gij = 0, and that g(s0
i;e s￿i) = e g +ij.
Also, sik = 0 implies that e gik = 0. De￿ne G(s￿
i) = fg 2 G : s￿




i;e s￿i) : e s￿i 2 S￿i;e sji = 1g:














i ;e s￿i)=e g
￿"t
￿i(e s￿i):
13Given that the mixed strategy pro￿les ￿"t, t 2 N have full support, ￿"t(e g) 6= 0, for all e g 2 G(s￿
i)
and t 2 N. Therefore, ￿i(s0
i;s￿
i;￿"t
￿i) > 0 is equivalent to










￿i) is continuous in ￿"t
￿i, and given that mijui(g￿ + ij) > 0, it su¢ ces to show
that limt!+1 ￿"t(e g)=￿"t(g￿) = 0, for all e g 2 G(s￿
i);e g 6= g￿. Note that limt!+1 ￿"t
￿i(e s￿i) = 0, for all
e s￿i 2 S￿i such that e sji = 1. Therefore, limt!+1 ￿"t(e g) = 0, for all e g 2 G(s￿






= 0, for all e g 2 G(s￿
i);e g 6= g￿;
is thus equivalent to showing that the rate of convergence of ￿"t(e g);e g 6= g￿ is at least one order of
magnitude higher than that of ￿"t(g￿). This is implied by properness, as detailed below.





k = fsk 2 Sk : uk(g(sk;s￿
￿k)) ￿ uk(g￿)g
S￿
k = fsk 2 Sk : uk(g(sk;s￿
￿k)) < uk(g￿)g
:
It is plain that Sk = S+
k [ S￿
k and that S+
k \ S￿
k = ;. Given that u is link-responsive and that s￿
is a Nash equilibrium strategy supporting g￿, we have g(s0
k;s￿
￿k) = g￿, for all s0
k 2 S+
k . Moreover,
as limt!+1 ￿"t = s￿, and given that each player￿ s expected payo⁄ is continuous in the vector of









k . Given that f￿"tgt2N is a







k ) ￿ "t:￿"t
k (s+




G0 = fg 2 G(s￿
i) : g 6= g￿;g = g(e sj;s￿
￿j);e sj 2 Sj;e sji = 1g
G00 = fg 2 G(s￿
i) : g 6= g￿;g = g(s￿
i;e s￿i);e s￿i 2 S￿i;e sji = 1;e sk 6= s￿
k for some k 6= jg
:
In words, G0 is the set of networks derived from g￿ under s￿ where only player j makes a mistake
(including always the announcement of the link ij), whereas G00 uncovers all the networks where
at least some other player (besides j) makes a mistake. Clearly, G(s￿
i)ng￿ = G0 [ G00. Let e g 2 G0.
Then,









But, for all e sj 2 Sj such that g(e sj;s￿
￿j) 2 G0, necessarily, e sj 2 S￿
j , implying in turn that ￿"t
j (e sj) ￿
"t￿"t
j (s0
j), for all t ￿ tj. Therefore, for all t ￿ tj, we have ￿"t(e g) ￿ K(e g)"t￿"t
￿i(s0
￿i), where K(e g) =
#
n
e sj 2 Sj : e sji = 1;g(e sj;s￿
￿j) = e g
o






























But, any e s￿i 2 S￿i such that e s￿i 6= s0
￿i and e sji = 1 contains at least one additional mistake with
respect to s0
￿i, implying that ￿"t
￿i(e s￿i)=￿"t
￿i(s0
￿i) ! 0 as t ! +1, for any such strategy pro￿le,
which implies in turn that limt!+1 ￿"t(e g)=￿"t(g￿) = 0.
Let now e g 2 G00. Let e s￿i 2 S￿i such that g = g(s￿
i;e s￿i). De￿ne L = fk 6= j : e sk 6= s￿
kg. By
de￿nition, L 6= ;. Now, ￿"t





















































L(e sL) = 0, limt!+1 ￿"t
L(s￿














implying that limt!+1 ￿"t(e g)=￿"t(g￿) = 0.





i), for all t ￿ T, implying that limt!+1 ￿"t
i (s￿
i) = 0, which is a contradiction.
Proposition 3 Suppose that u is link-responsive. Then, PNE(u) ￿ PRE(u) if and only if ui is
￿￿strongly concave in own new links on ￿i(g;u), for all i 2 N and g 2 PNE(u), for some ￿ > 0.
Proof. Let u be link-responsive. Suppose ￿rst that ui is ￿￿strongly concave in own new links on
￿i(g;u), for all i 2 N and g 2 PNE(u), for some ￿ > 0. Let g￿ 2 PNE(u), and denote by S￿1(g￿) ￿
S the set of all pure strategy Nash equilibrium pro￿les that support g￿. Let s0 2 S￿1(g￿). Recall
that ￿i(g￿;u) = fij = 2 g￿ : mijui(g￿ + ij) < 0g and g￿
in￿i(g￿;u) = fij = 2 g￿ : mijui(g￿ + ij) > 0g.23
Given that g￿ is a pairwise-Nash equilibrium outcome, necessarily ij 2 g￿
in￿i(g￿;u) implies that
mijuj(g￿ + ij) < 0 (as, otherwise, creating the currently missing link ij would be pro￿table for
both i and j). For all i 2 N, let s￿
i = s0
i _ [ij2g￿
i n￿i(g￿;u)e(ij). By de￿nition, s￿
ij = 0 if and only if
ij 2 ￿i(g￿;u). Indeed, suppose that ij = 2 ￿i(g￿;u). Then, either ij 2 gi and s0
ij = 1, implying that
s￿
ij = 1. Or ij 2 g￿
in￿i(g￿;u), in which case s0
ij = 0 but, by construction, s￿
ij = 1. By ￿￿strong
23Note that the strict inequality derives from link-responsiveness.
15concavity, s￿ is still a pure strategy Nash equilibrium pro￿le that supports g￿, that is, s￿ 2 S￿1(g￿)
and g￿ = g(s￿).
For all t 2 N, t 6= 0, de￿ne the following marginal probabilities:
￿￿t(sij = 1;￿) =
(
1





ij = 0 if and only if ij 2 ￿i(g￿;u) (and, thus, s￿
ij = 1, otherwise) these marginal
probabilities for each single link announcement are just a tremble away from the pure strategy
link announcement in s￿. Tremble probabilities for links ij = 2 ￿i(g￿;u) are one order of magnitude
higher than trembles for links ij 2 ￿i(g￿;u).24 Under the marginal distribution, each single link
ij follows a Bernoulli process with probability ￿￿t(sij = 1;￿). Denote by ￿￿t the (independent)
product of such marginal probabilities. By construction, this is a multivariate Bernoulli process
that constitutes a completely mixed strategy such that limt!+1 ￿￿t(s￿) = 1.
For each player k 2 N, we partition the strategy set Sknfs￿




de￿ned as follows: (
S
6=








It is plain that Sk = S
6=
k [ S=
k and that S
6=
k \ S=




k . Then, by link-responsiveness of the network payo⁄ function u, and given
that s￿
i is a best-response to s￿
￿i, we have ui(g￿) > ui(g(s0
i;s￿














i;e s￿i)) ￿ ui(g(s0
i;e s￿i))]:
But, limt!+1 ￿￿t(s￿
￿i) = 1 whereas limt!+1 ￿￿t(e s￿i) = 0, for all e s￿i 6= s￿
￿i. Therefore, there exists
some T0










k . Now, by de￿nition, g(s0
i;s￿










i;e s￿i)) ￿ ui(g(s0
i;e s￿i))];
and all the probability weights ￿t




￿i) by looking at the rates of convergence of the di⁄erent probabilities.
24If ￿i(g
￿;u) = ?, for all i 2 N then, necessarily, g
￿
i = ?, for all i 2 N (as, otherwise, link creation would be
strictly pro￿table for any pair of players not yet linked in g
￿), implying that g
￿ is the complete network, which is
a proper equilibrium under link-responsiveness for the following reasons. First, given that f￿
￿tg have full support,
the expected payo⁄s accruing to each player under ￿
￿t are a continuous function of the trembles. Second, any link
cutting is strictly harmful for every player (from link-responsiveness and the fact that the network is a pairwise-Nash
equilibrium). Therefore, by continuity on the size of the trembles, it is strictly optimal not to cut any link for small
enough trembles. Therefore, we assume throughout that ￿i(g
￿;u) 6= ? for at least some i 2 N. In words, there is
some tremble over (at least) one link one order of magnitude higher than some other trembles on other links (that
is, trembles are not all of the same order of magnitude).
16Suppose ￿rst that ij 2 g￿ for all j 2 N, that is, player i is fully directly connected in g￿. Then,
S=
k = ;, and we are done.
Suppose, on the contrary, that ij = 2 g￿ for some j 2 N. Take one such link ij. Then, we
distinguish two cases. Either mijui(g￿ + ij) < 0 and s￿
ij = 0, or mijui(g￿ + ij) > 0. In this latter
case, by de￿nition of s￿, we have s￿
ij = 1.
Recall also that mijui(g￿) > 0, for all ij 2 g￿. For all such links, by de￿nition of s￿, we have
s￿
ij = 1.
Take e s￿i 6= s￿
￿i. Now, ui(g(s￿
i;e s￿i)) 6= ui(g(s0
i;e s￿i) if and only if (by link-responsiveness)
g(s￿
i;e s￿i) 6= g(s0
i;e s￿i), which is equivalent to the fact that e s￿i is reciprocating at least one link
that is announced in s0
i but that is not announced in s￿
i. Formally, there exists at least one ij = 2 g￿
such that s￿
ije sji = 0 but s0
ije sji = 1, equivalent to s￿
ij = 0 and s0
ij = e sji = 1. Necessarily, for any
such link, mijui(g￿ + ij) < 0. Also, given that, g(s0
i;s￿
￿i) = g￿, this link ij is not announced in
s￿
￿i as, otherwise, g(s0
i;s￿
￿i) and g￿ would di⁄er for at least this link. Therefore, it is also true that
mijuj(g￿ + ij) < 0. Then, by de￿nition, ￿￿t
￿i(e sji) = 1=t.
More generally, let b S￿i be the set of strategy pro￿les e s￿i 6= s￿
￿i such that e sji = 1 for some
ij = 2 g￿, mijui(g￿ + ij) < 0 and mijuj(g￿ + ij) < 0, and e skl = s￿
kl, otherwise. In words, b S￿i is the
set of strategy pro￿le for i￿ s opponents that di⁄er from s￿
￿i only for one link which corresponds to
a mistake of probability 1=t. Given that any other strategy pro￿le e s￿i 2 b S￿i, e s￿i 6= s￿
￿i, di⁄ers
from s￿
￿i from either more than one mistake (with probability at most 1=t each) or from only one










i;e s￿i)) ￿ ui(g(s0




Let e s￿i 2 b S￿i. Then, ui(g(s￿
i;e s￿i)) ￿ ui(g(s0
i;e s￿i)) = ￿mijui(g￿ + ij) for some ij = 2 g￿ such that
mijui(g￿ + ij) < 0. Therefore, there exists some T00
i > 0 such that, for all t ￿ T
00






i;e s￿i)) ￿ ui(g(s0







￿i)), for all s0
i 2 S=
i . Let now T = maxfT0
i;T00
i : i 2 Ng.
Then, for all i 2 N and for all t ￿ T, s￿






￿i)), for all s0
i 2 Si, t ￿ T and i 2 N. (4)
We ￿rst introduce a de￿nition. Consider a normal form game ￿ = (N;S;u) with an extensive
form equivalent ￿. The extensive form is characterized by a set of histories H, a function P that
assigns to each non-terminal history a player in N, a partition Ii of fh 2 H : P(h) = ig. The set
of actions available after the non-terminal history h to P(h) is denoted by A(h), and we assume
that h;h0 2 Ii implies that A(h) = A(h0).
17De￿nition 7 (Van Damme, 1984) A sequence f￿"tgt2N of completely mixed strategies in ￿ with
limit ￿ induces a quasi-perfect equilibrium in ￿ if, for the corresponding sequence of completely
mixed behavior strategies ￿"t with limit ￿, for all i 2 N and for all information set h 2 H such that




￿i), for all ￿0
i and t ￿ T.
Let ￿(u) be any extensive form game equivalent to the simultaneous move game of link formation
with network payo⁄s u. We prove the following result.
Lemma 1 The sequence f￿￿tgt2N with limit s￿ induces a quasi-perfect equilibrium in ￿(u).
Proof. Denote by ￿￿t the behavioral strategies induced by ￿￿t, for all t 2 N. This behavioral
strategies generate a probability distribution over the set of terminal nodes to which we associate
a probability distribution over networks in G denoted by ￿￿t 2 ￿(G). If ￿￿t 2 ￿(G) denote the
probability distribution on G induced by ￿￿t, it is plain that ￿￿t 2 O(￿￿t), when t ! +1. In
words, the probabilities assigned to any single network on G by ￿￿t and by ￿￿t are of the same





￿i), for all ￿0
i, and for all i:￿
Therefore, when ui is ￿￿strongly concave in own new links on ￿i(g;u), for all i 2 N and g 2
PNE(u), for some ￿ > 0, we can construct a sequence f￿￿tg that induces a quasi-perfect equilibrium
in any extensive form equivalent to Myerson￿ s simultaneous move game in network formation. By
the extensive form characterization of properness by Mailath, Samuelson and Swinkels (1997), we
conclude that this sequence sustains a proper equilibrium in the original normal form game.25
Suppose now that ￿￿strong concavity does not hold for some i. Then, using the arguments in
the proof of Theorem 1 we prove, mutatis mutandis, that, for any sequence of completely mixed
strategy pro￿les f￿"tg converging to s￿, there always exists a strategy s0
i 6= s￿
i yielding strictly
higher payo⁄s against ￿"t
￿i than s￿
i.
Lemma 2 The connections model is 1-convex.
Proof. Let ij 2 g:
First note that dik(g) ￿ dik(g ￿ ij) for all k 2 N: Let
￿ij(g) = fk 2 N : dik(g) < dik(g ￿ ij)g:




[￿dik(g) ￿ ￿dik(g￿ij)] ￿ c:
25See Proposition 1 in Mailath et al. (1997).




[￿dik(g) ￿ ￿dik(g￿ij￿il)] ￿ 2c:
Note the following.
First, ￿ij(g) [ ￿il(g) ￿ ￿ij;il(g): Indeed, for all k 2 ￿ij(g); we have dik(g) < dik(g ￿ ij) ￿
dik(g ￿ ij ￿ il): Idem for ￿ij(g):
Second, ￿ij(g) \ ￿il(g) = ;: Indeed, let k 2 ￿ij(g) \ ￿il(g): Then, both l and j are on (two
di⁄erent) shortest paths in g between i and k: Consider the sortest path in g between i and k that
croses through l. This path still exists in g￿ij, implying that dik(g) = dik(g￿ij); in contradiction
with k 2 ￿ij(g):
Third, ￿dik(g) ￿ ￿dik(g￿ij￿il) ￿ ￿dik(g) ￿ ￿dik(g￿ij), as dik(g ￿ ij) ￿ dik(g ￿ ij ￿ il): Similarly for
￿dik(g) ￿ ￿dik(g￿il):
Altogether, this implies that mij;ilui(g) ￿ mijui(g) + milui(g):
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